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ANALYSIS OF AVIATION LIABILITY
COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS
-A RECENT CASE SURVEY-
JOHN H. BALLARD* AND THOMAS H. CHERO**
INTRODUCTION
r ONTRARY TO THE belief held by many insureds and all
plaintiffs' counsel, exclusions are not the product of a collu-
sive effort by underwriters, and claim-managers to attempt to delete,
in fine print, all coverage provided by insurance agreements
under every set of facts that could possibly result in a loss.
Exclusions do, however, play a vital role in the aviation policy
and serve a number of purposes. One such purpose is to assure
that the risk undertaken by the insurer is commensurate with the
premium charged the insured. Since extrahazardous risks must
command an increased premium, one way to avoid charging all
insureds for extrahazardous activities undertaken by only a few is
to exclude coverage for such activities. A premium surcharge can
then be demanded of those few who wish to eliminate the exclu-
sion from their individual policy.
Other purposes of exclusions are to prevent multiple indemni-
fication of a claimant through overlapping coverage in the same
or separate policies and to avoid shifting the loss from one insurer
to another where one has received a premium to cover the loss
which it attempts to avoid and which it should reasonably be
expected to pay. Exclusions also serve the function of regulation,
By excluding coverage for certain activities altogether, or by ex-
cluding coverage when the pilot in command is not currently
qualified to undertake the activity, psychological pressure is exerted
* B.A., J.D., Univ. of Baltimore, Vice President of Claims AVEMCO Ins. Co.
** B.S., Univ. of Illinois; J.D., Univ. of Iowa, Claim Counsel AVEMCO Ins.
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on the insured to refrain from engaging in those activities by sub-
jecting him to the risk of personal liability should a loss occur.
In this way, exclusions can serve a vital public policy role.
There is no standardized aviation policy in use as of this
date. Due to the competitive nature of the insurance market,
however, most policies necessarily exclude the same basic activi-
ties and many policies contain identical language. Based upon
this premise, this article will review six common exclusions in light
of holdings in aviation cases from 1976 through 1978. Only current
aviation cases will be discussed, and only six basic exclusions will
be covered, although more or less may exist in any one insurer's
policy. The exclusions will not be given exhaustive treatment be-
cause the analysis of any one exclusion could be the subject of an
extensive study in itself. This paper is intended to cover only re-
cent decisions involving the six "basic" exclusions. It does not
delve into the statutory regulation of exclusionary language and
restrictions states may impose through the use of "anti-technical"
statutes or through outright bans on certain exclusions.
ASSUMED LIABILITY EXCLUSION
A typical assumed liability exclusion provides: "This policy does
not apply... Under Coverage A [Liability], to liability assumed by
any insured under any contract or agreement. . ."' The basic
purpose of this exclusion is to limit the liability of the insurer to
that risk which is the basis of the insurance contract. The insurer
assesses the potential loss of a prospective insured and calculates
a premium that will be adequate to undertake insuring the risk.
If an insured were able to assume liability by contract that he
would not have had otherwise, the insurer's risk would increase
proportionately, making the previously calculated premium in-
adequate.
The general rule regarding the assumed liability exclusion can
be summarized as follows:
A provision in a liability policy specifically excluding from cover-
age liability assumed by the insured under a contract not defined
in the policy is operative-in the sense that it relieves the insurer
of liability otherwise existing under the policy-only in situations
1 Avemco Insurance Co. Policy Forms Series AVP (7-71), Exclusions § (a).
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where the insured would not be liable to a third party except for
the fact that he assumed liability under an express agreement
with such party, but does not relieve the insurer from liability
under the policy where the liability of the insured assumed by the
insured under an express contract with a third party is coextensive
with the insured's liability imposed upon him by law. In other
words, where the express contract actually adds nothing to the
insured's liability, the contractual liability exclusion clause is not
applicable, but where the insured's liability would not exist except
for the express contract, the contractual liability clause relieves
the insurer of liability."
In Lebow Associates & Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. Avemco
Insurance Co.,* the court dealt with a denial of coverage by Avemco
to its insured Lebow Associates based upon the assumed liability
exclusion. Lebow leased a Beech Bonanza from Southfield Leasing
and purchased from Avemco a policy of liability insurance on the
aircraft. Southfield was endorsed onto the policy as an additional
insured. The lease between Southfield and Lebow contained the
following provision:
Indemnity: Lessee [Lebow] agrees to and does hereby indemnify
Lessor [Southfield] and hold Lessor, its agents and employees,
harmless of and from any and all losses, damages, claims, demands
or liability of any kind or nature whatsoever, including legal ex-
penses arising from the use, condition . . . or operation of said
aircraft, and by whomsoever used or operated during the terms
hereof ....
The aircraft crashed on January 17, 1974, killing pilot Lebow
and passenger/employee of Lebow, Charles Storey.
In state court the passenger/employee's estate, unable to sue
Lebow Associates directly due to the workmen's compensation
laws, sued Southfield on the grounds that it had provided a defec-
tive aircraft. Southfield immediately sought indemnity from Lebow
under the lease agreement and Lebow tendered the defense of the
indemnity action to Avemco. Avemco declined to defend because
the claim by Southfield had arisen out of contractual liability
assumed by Lebow which was excluded from coverage.
A declaratory judgment was, started in the United States district
IAnnot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1114, 1123 (1959).
3 439 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
4Id. at 1290.
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court by Lebow to determine coverage. In a memorandum opinion
and order on a motion for summary judgment, the court found
for the plaintiff Lebow. Citing 63 A.L.R.2d 1114, 1123 (1959),
the court held that the exclusion for assumed liability was in-
applicable:
A major rationale underlying the principle that assumed liability
exclusion clauses are inoperative when the liability assumed is co-
extensive with the insured's liability imposed by law is that the
insured's assumption of liability does not expand the insurance
company's element of risk, upon which the insured's premium
amounts are predicated, beyond the original contractual agreement
of the parties. To allow an insurance company to avoid payment
of its insured's liability to a third party, which otherwise exists by
operation of law, merely because the insured contractually assumed
the same liability to the third party would be to judicially condone
a unilateral alteration of the substantive terms of the contract in
favor of the insurance company on the grounds which are not even
relevant to the element of risk which underlies each party's bar-
gaining position....
Both Lebow Associates and Southfield were insured parties un-
der Avemco's policy. Avemco agreed ... to pay all sums which the
insureds became legally obligated to pay as damages because of
bodily injury ...arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or
use of the aircraft ... Thus, payment of Lebow Associates' legal
expenses and any judgment in favor of Southfield ... is within the
risk originally undertaken by Avemco in consideration for the
premiums paid by Lebow Associates and Southfield.
The assumption of Southfield's liability by Lebow Associates
under the terms of an aircraft lease does not affect the degree of
risk undertaken by Avemco since that risk also included liability
incurred by Southfield....
In keeping with the principal that an insurance policy clause
excluding contractually assumed liability from coverage is inopera-
tive when contractually assumed liability adds nothing to the in-
sured's liability, Avemco's exclusions clause (a) is hereby held
to be inoperative with respect to the liability assumed by Lebow
Associates in their lease agreement with Southfield.!
It can be seen from this decision that the assumed liability ex-
clusion will be given effect where the insured assumes liability that
he would not otherwise have had in the absence of the assumption
5Id. at 1291-92.
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agreement. When the assumption creates no additional risk for
the insurer, however, the exclusion will be ineffective.
Insurers may allow the insured to assume liability under a con-
tract provided the liability assumed can be ascertained by the
insurer at the time of premium calculation. Most aviation policies
specifically allow a named insured to assume liability under an
airport contract, which is commonly defined as "a written agree-
ment required by statute or ordinance or by any rule or regulation
promulgated by any Federal, State, County or Municipal Authority
as a condition to the use of an airport or airport facility.'" The
named insured usually has no choice with regard to airport con-
tracts. Either he signs the assumption agreement or he cannot use
the airport facilities. Insurers can take into consideration this in-
crease in liability because it is known and fixed. The premium
can be adjusted accordingly when the policy is issued.
Leases for the use of airport facilities and for the rental of air-
craft increasingly are being drafted by attorneys whose standard
practice is to include a hold-harmless and indemnification provi-
sion for the benefit of the lessor. By agreeing to such a term, the
lessee/insured does not invalidate what liability coverage he has
under his owner's or non-owner's aircraft policy, but he does as-
sume liability under the agreement which he otherwise would not
have incurred. The cure for this "coverage gap" is to have the
lessor properly insure himself for his own negligent activities and
to eliminate this liability-transferring provision from the lease.
EXCLUSION FOR PROPERTY IN CARE, CUSTODY
OR CONTROL OF INSURED
A standard exclusion of liability coverage for property in the
care, custody or control of the insured provides: "This policy does
not apply ... under Coverage A [Liability] to injury to or destruc-
tion of property owned or transported by the insured or property
rented to or in charge of the insured. . . ."' This exclusion serves
two purposes. It limits the liability of the insurer to that risk con-
templated at the inception of the policy and for which a premium
was charged. It also denies coverage for damages that should be
0 Avemco Insurance Co. Policy Forms Series AVP(7-71), Definitions 5 6.
7 Avemco Insurance Co. Policy Forms Series AVP(7-71), Exclusions § (b).
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covered under first-party hull insurance on the insured's aircraft
or under some other non-aviation policy. Analysis shows the ex-
clusion to be composed of four parts: liability is excluded for in-
jury to or destruction of property owned by the insured, property
transported by the insured, property rented to the insured and
property in charge of the insured.
Property owned by the insured is not the proper object of
liability coverage. Such property should be covered under first-
party coverage rather than third-party liability. If the insured dam-
ages his aircraft, compensation for that claim should be the object
of hull and not liability coverage. The insured is not legally obli-
gated to pay for a loss of his own property because a person can-
not be obligated to pay himself. Should the damaged aircraft be
subject to a lien, however, the insured still would be legally obli-
gated to pay the amount of the loan. If the insured is carrying per-
sonal effects or other property owned by himself, that property
should be covered under a homeowner's, business or other applic-
able first-party policy.
Property which the insured rents, is in charge of or which he is
transporting, other than his own personal property, is properly the
subject of third-party liability coverage. As a general rule it will
be unknown at the time of setting the premium what property of
others will be in the care, custody or control of the insured at
any given time. Thus, because the risk cannot be assessed and an
adequate premium cannot be charged, the risk necessarily must
be excluded. An example of this unforeseen risk would be an in-
sured who, as a favor, transports valuable cargo for a friend,
such as diamonds or furs, and negligently causes a loss of the
cargo. The carriage of precious or other goods can be insured
under a policy other than an aircraft policy, and the insurer can
assess a proper premium based upon the value of the goods car-
ried on the particular trip along with the probability of loss.
This exclusion also disallows coverage for damage to a rented
or borrowed aircraft hull. An insurer will not know what type of
aircraft an insured may use under the "use of other aircraft" pro-
vision contained in most aviation policies. An insured may borrow
or rent anything from a $3,500 Champ to a $250,000 Aerostar.
Thus, there is the need for the exclusion because the unknown
COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS
nature of the risk precludes the establishment of a proper premium.
Any insured who wishes to have coverage for damage to a rented
or borrowed aircraft can either apply for a waiver of subrogation
on the owner's policy, or he can specify a hull value and have his
policy specifically endorsed to cover such a loss for an additional
premium charge. It would be uneconomical for insureds and in-
surers alike to do otherwise.
A recent aviation case involving this exclusion is Benningfield v.
Avemco Insurance Co. Plaintiff insured a 1965 Cessna Skyhawk
with Avemco. The policy provided indemnity to the plaintiff/
insured for sums she might become legally obligated to pay for
damage to property arising out of her use of the aircraft. The
policy contained a standard care, custody or control exclusion,
allowed the policyholder to use aircraft other than the insured
aircraft and permitted her liability insurance to transfer to other
aircraft which she might use.
Mrs. Benningfield borrowed a 1963 Musketeer and damaged it.
Suit was filed by the owner against Mrs. Benningfield. Avemco
refused to defend, claiming that the damaged hull was prop-
erty which fell within the care, custody or control exclusion.
In a suit brought by Mrs. Benningfield after Avemco's refusal, the
court stated:
[A]ny extension of liability insurance to other aircraft afforded
no coverage for damage to the substitute aircraft itself. Applicable
is the quoted exclusion of damage to property in charge of the
insured. In construing similar language used in an automobile
policy this court has previously held in Northwestern Mutual In-
surance Co. v. Haglund, 387 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. App. 1965),
that the exclusion of damage to property in charge of the in-
sured is clear and unambiguous and excludes liability under the
policy for collision damage to the property while in the custody
and being operated by the named insured as a permissive user....
the 1963 Musketeer was being operated by appellant Theda Ben-
ningfield at the time of the accident and, hence, was property in
charge of the insured not covered under the policy.'
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EXCLUSION
A typical workmen's compensation exclusion for liability and/or
'561 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
'Id. at 737.
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medical payments coverage reads: "This policy does not apply and
no coverage is afforded: ... Under Coverages A, C and D (Bodily
Injury) . .. To bodily injury to, sickness, disease or death of any
employee of the insured while engaged in the employment of the
insured. . . ."" A basic function of this exclusion is to exclude
coverage for a loss which is or should be covered by other insur-
ance, such as workmen's compensation, and for which a premium
is being paid to the other insurance carrier to undertake such loss.
Little litigation arises from the application of this exclusion except
where the loss involves more than one potential insured. Litiga-
tion is almost guaranteed to ensue in these situations.
The most recent case involving the application of this exclu-
sion by an insurer is Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Emmco In-
surance Co." In that case Emmco insured Investments Dynamics
Corporation (IDC) as owner of a Lockheed Super Ventura. IDC
contracted with International Jet Division of Investors Growth In-
dustry (JET) to provide pilots. The policy was then endorsed to
name Jet as an additional insured. Jet furnished a captain and
copilot on a flight carrying three employees of IDC. The aircraft
crashed, injuring the IDC employees in the course of their em-
ployment.
The IDC employees brought claims against Jet. Emmco denied
coverage and defended on the grounds that claimants were em-
ployees of the insured and, thus, excluded under the workmen's
compensation exclusion clause. The court disagreed with Emmco
stating:
The problem in interpretation posed by this exclusion is, who is
'the insured' for the purpose thereof?
There appears to be a general unanimity among the courts that
where either a named insured or an additional insured seeks cover-
age for injury to his own employee, the exclusion does apply. On
the other hand, the courts generally agree that where one named
insured seeks coverage for injury to an employee of another
named insured, the exclusion does not apply.
The Minnesota cases are consistent with these holdings. No case
of this court has allowed coverage under a policy containing an
10Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Emmco Ins. Co., 309 Minn. 21, 243 N.W.2d 134,
138 (1976).
11309 Minn. 21, 243 N.W.2d 134 (1976).
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employee exclusion clause where an employee claims against his
own employer. On the other hand, two Minnesota cases held that
claims against a named insured for injury to an employee of an-
other named insured were not barred from coverage by employee
exclusion clauses."
PURPOSE OF USE EXCLUSION
A basic pleasure and business aircraft policy excludes coverage
when a "charge" is made to others for use of the insured aircraft.
The language used in this exclusion varies but each variation has
as its purpose the elimination of increased risk for which a premium
is not being charged. One typical exclusionary clause contained
in policy issued by Eagle Star Insurance Company, Ltd., reads that
coverage is excepted when the insured is "operating the aircraft
under the terms of any agreement which provides any remunera-
tion for the use of said aircraft."' "a This exclusion was interpreted
in an action brought by American Casualty Company of Pennsyl-
vania (American) against Eagle Star Insurance Co., Ltd. (Eagle)."4
In that action American sought a declaratory judgment that it had
no liability in a plane crash which killed four persons because its
policy covering passengers was secondary, while Eagle's was pri-
mary. Eagle asserted that its coverage was excluded because its
insured, the Silco Corporation, was being "remunerated" under
the terms of the exclusion by the C. W. Silver Company, which
paid all expenses of operation, maintenance, storage and a pro rata
share of insurance premiums on the aircraft in return for its use.
In addressing the question presented, the court stated:
[T]here is a difference between defendant's policy and policies
which use various language such as an operation for which "a
charge is made" or, "a fare is charged". The language used is
defendant's policy, which we assume was used advisedly, seems
to be of broader import in saying "under the terms of any agree-
ment which provides for any remuneration for the use of said
aircraft." A primary meaning of the term "remuneration" is to
pay an equivalent for, i.e., in the sense of reimbursing for a service,
loss or expense. But it is also sometimes used in the broader sense
of simply paying something for such a service, loss or expense.
2 d. at 21, 243 N.W.2d at 138-39.
13American Cas. Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 568 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1977).
1, Id. at 732.
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But this does not mean that a profit must be realized.
On the problem here involved, it is important to consider the
purpose of the exclusionary clause. . . The insurance risks are
rated in accordance with the amount of exposure reasonably to be
expected in such usage. But if in permitting others to use it the
owner acquires any advantage to himself, he is more apt to permit
such usage and thus increase the number of flights, and accordingly
increase the insurer's risk. In this connection there is also to be
considered the difference in liability in a gratuitous usage, as com-
pared to a compensated one, under an aircraft guest statute.
On the basis of what has been said in this opinion our conclu-
sion is that: that if "remuneration" be understood as merely an
equivalent, there is no question whatsoever but that the use of the
plane was so "remunerated". Further, that even under the broader
meaning of paying something for such service, that inasmuch as
the C. W. Silver Company was paying for the entire maintenance
of the airplane, including mechanical repairs and engine overhaul
and for the hangar fees for storage, there was substantial material
benefit to the owner of Silco Corporation, which amounted to
"remuneration" within the meaning of the policy.
[T]he exclusionary clause in the policy of defendant Eagle Star
Insurance Company is applicable and thus exempts it from lia-
bility in connection with the plane crash."-
In applying this exclusion one must look at the specific policy
term or phrase used, coupled with the facts and surrounding cir-
cumstances. More than with any other exclusion, courts tend to
"go all over the board" with their interpretations of this exclusion.
NONAPPROVED PILOT EXCLUSION
All policies of aircraft insurance restrict liability coverage when
the aircraft is "in-flight" while being operated by a pilot not meet-
ing the requirements set forth in the declarations. Pilot qualifica-
tion requirements (pilot warranties) are tailored to meet the
needs of the named insured. Generally, the greater the number of
pilots who are allowed to fly the aircraft, the greater the risk of
loss to the insurer. The lower the flight experience of the approved
pilots, the greater the chance of loss becomes. Premiums must be
tailored accordingly.
A representative non-approved pilot exclusion reads: "This poli-
'" Id. at 733-34. (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
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cy does not apply.., to any aircraft while in flight.., being oper-
ated by a pilot not meeting the requirements set forth in Item 7 of
the declarations. . . ."" Item Seven of the Declaration provides:
"This policy applies when the aircraft is in flight, only while being
operated by one of the following pilots . . . who, (1) holds a
valid and effective Pilot and Medical Certificate, (2) has a current
biennial flight review and (3) if carrying passengers, has com-
pleted at least three Take-Offs and Landings within the preceding
90 days in an aircraft of the same make and model as the insured
aircraft."" Item Seven then will proceed to either list approved
pilots by name (closed pilot warranty) or to set forth minimum
pilot experience requirements (open pilot warranty) for those
who will be operating the aircraft. Item Seven may contain both
open and closed pilot warranty provisions.
The purpose of this exclusion, as with others, is to allow the
insurance carrier to assess its risk at the inception of the policy
and to charge an appropriate premium. A policy warranty that
permits only one named person to fly the aircraft allows the in-
surer to ascertain its risk based on this one pilot's qualifications
and experience. On the other hand, if a named insured wants to
have an open pilot warranty, allowing any person with a specified
minimum number of pilot hours to fly the aircraft, the premium
charged must necessarily reflect the increased chance of loss.
The nonapproved pilot exclusion, in conjunction with the "Item
Seven" pilot listing, can be breached in at least four separate ways.
Where the policy contains a closed pilot warranty, an unnamed
pilot operating the aircraft in flight will cause a breach. Where
the policy contains an open pilot warranty, a pilot operating the
aircraft in flight without the required minimum hours of experience
will cause a breach. Given that the pilot is either named or meets
the policy's experience requirements, the warranty can be breached
if the pilot is not "current," i.e., he does not have a valid and effec-
tive medical certificate and biennial flight review. A pilot who
otherwise qualifies may be disqualified because he does not possess
the necessary rating or certificate (e.g., instrument ticket, multi-
engine rating, private pilot certificate) to undertake a specific
" Avemco Insurance Co. Policy Form AVP (7-71)-4, Exclusions S (g) (3).
17 Avemco Insurance Co. Policy Form AER(5-77), Declarations Item 7.
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flight. Each of these possible breaches of the nonapproved pilot
exclusion are examined separately below.
Pilot Not Named or Not Having Minimum Required Experience
A recent case involving the nonapproved pilot exclusion is
Benton Casing Service, Inc. v. Avemco Insurance Co.' Benton
Casing insured a Cessna 185 seaplane, naming their employee Sam
Whately as their sole pilot. Billy Kirkpatrick was added later as
a named pilot by endorsement. A loss occurred on take-off while
the aircraft was being operated by Harry Roth, who was not named
in the closed pilot warranty in the policy. Avemco denied coverage.
Reversing a lower court decision, the appellate court held for
the insurance carrier stating: "We are well aware that the general
rule in Louisiana is that an insurance policy is a contract between
the insured and the insurer, and thus, like all contracts it is the
law between the parties. If the policy is clear and free from am-
biguity, it must be enforced as written."' The court went on to
state: "However, the trend of modem authority is to hold that
there is no forfeiture if the breach of condition or warranty did
not contribute to the loss, or did not increase the risk at the time
of the loss."2°
The court did not go any further with the "modem trend," stat-
ing that it felt constrained to intrude into the area in which the
legislature has refrained from establishing an anti-technical rule
for breach of an inconsequential condition. The court, however,
stopped short of requiring the insurer to prove a causal connection
between the breach and the cause of loss, leaving that for the
Louisiana legislature which had already required the same where
the loss involved a policy of fire insurance."
Non-Current Pilot
No reported cases are available regarding the lack of biennial
flight review as grounds for a valid denial of coverage. There are
two recent irreconcilable cases, however, involving a denial of
coverage based upon the lack of a required current medical cer-
tificate.
18 366 So.2d 938 (La. Ct. of App. 1978).
19 Id. at 939.
20 Id. (citing APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw & PRAcCE S 4146 at 439 (1972)).
21 Id. at 940.
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In South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Collins," the court dealt
with a policy that specifically required that the pilot have a "valid
and effective. .. medical certificate." At the time of loss, the named
pilot was operating the aircraft under an expired medical certificate
and the insurer denied coverage. The named insured brought a
declaratory judgment action in which both parties stipulated that
no causal connection existed between the lack of a current medical
certificate and the loss of the aircraft. The court held that in
order to avoid liability under an aircraft insurance policy, the
insurer is required to demonstrate a causal connection between
the crash of the aircraft and the insured's failure to have a valid
and effective medical certificate as provided by the terms of the
policy."
A different result was reached in a recent case from Tennessee.
Insurance Co. of North America v. Lynpal, Inc.' involved a denial
of coverage to the insured based upon the lack of a current medical
certificate. The policy required the pilot have "certificates appro-
priate for the flight ... as- required by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration."' The court stated:
We agree with the proposition that the time honored rule of insur-
ance contract construction . . . will be construed more strictly
against the insurer. However, we do not find that the language
of the contract which is questioned here is ambiguous. The lan-
guage of the policy states perfectly clearly that the coverage pro-
vided thereby shall not apply while the aircraft is in flight unless
the pilot maintains a valid pilot's certificate "with ratings and cer-
tificates appropriate for flight and the aircraft as required by the
Federal Aviation Administration."
When we look to the regulations it is clearly stated that: "No
person may act as pilot in command under a certificate issued to
him ... unless he has in his personal possession an appropriate
current medical certificate...
We do not conceive that the law requires a causal connection
between the language of an exclusion and the cause of a loss."
22 237 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1977).
2Id. at 362.
"Insurance Co. of N. America v. Lynpal, Inc., 14 Av. Cas. 18,067 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1977).
25 Id. at 18,068.
" Id. at 18,070-71 (citation omitted).
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Pilot Not Appropriately Rated
In Schepps Grocer Supply, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co.,"
Ranger Insurance Company's denial of coverage was tested under
the provision in its policy which required pilot Masterson to
obtain a multi-engine rating. At the time of crash, Masterson
had been recommended by his flight instructor for the rating. He
possessed the necessary skills to pass the test and the only reason
for Masterson's not having the rating was his inability to locate
an FAA examiner to administer the test. In its statement of the
case the court said:
This is a suit certaining [sic] an interpretation of an aviation in-
surance contract. The principal question presented is whether,
once an insurer asserts a policy exclusion, it is necessary to prove
a causal connection between the loss suffered and the breach of
the policy. The exclusionary clause in question provides for no
coverage unless the named pilot has a multi-engine rating ...
[W]e hold that no proof of causal connection is necessary, . . ."
A decision going the other way with respect to a required rating
is Glover v. National Insurance Underwriters." This declaratory
judgment action involved denial of coverage based upon the lack
of an appropriate rating on the part of the pilot, a Visual Flight
Rules (VFR) pilot who flew into Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
conditions without an instrument flight rating. The applicable
policy provision stated that coverage would not apply "to any
aircraft, while in flight, . . . whenever the pilot operating the air-
craft is not qualified in accordance with the requirements specified
in Item 6.... ."' Item Six provided: "PILOTS: This policy applies
when the aircraft is in flight: (a) (only when being operated by
Rogers) . . . (b) while holding an FAA pilot certificate . . . and
while properly rated for the flight and the aircraft, .. . .,,1
National Insurance Underwriters argued that pilot Rogers was
not properly rated for the flight because of his lack of an instru-
ment rating. The court disagreed, however, deciding that the
phrase "the flight" was ambiguous. The majority stated: "The
27545 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ. ref'd n.r.e.).
29 Id.
29545 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977).
1J Id. at 757.
31 d.
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flight is to be characterized at its inception; therefore, if the pilot's
knowledge is important, the knowledge that he will be flying in
IFR weather must exist at the flight's inception. . . Rogers did
not know when he took off that he was flying into IFR weather."'
The majority went on to say:
Our holding may seem harsh to the insurer because we have held
this insurance policy applicable even though it is undisputed that
the non-instrument rated pilot was flying in IFR conditions when
the crash occurred. We note that our construction of this pilot
clause was necessary, however, only because National chose to
phrase the insurance policy in the ambiguous manner heretofore
discussed. Language was available, to and known to, National
which would have clearly and plainly excluded from coverage a
non-instrument rated pilot who operated his aircraft in IFR weather
conditions.'
A strong dissent by Justice Johnson criticized the logic of the
majority opinion. One important factor which the majority ignored
in resolving the alleged ambiguity was that the term "in flight" was
defined in the policy as being "the time the aircraft moves forward
in taking off, while in the air, and until the aircraft completes its
landing."' Justice Johnson stated:
The policy language makes it clear that the flight contemplated is
the entire travel, from the beginning to the end, and that the pilot
is therefore required to be properly rated for all segments of the
flight. According to the stipulation here, the pilot flew directly into
IFR weather, a condition of which he had been advised before the
flight began and a condition of which he had full knowledge....
Under the circumstances of this case the pilot was not 'properly
rated for the flight."'
It is a standard feature of an aircraft insurance policy to exclude
liability coverage, as well as hull coverage and medical payments,
when the insured aircraft is being operated in flight by a student
pilot carrying passengers. The exclusion is usually found in one
of two forms--the "direct" exclusion and the "appropriately rated
for the flight involved" or "indirect" exclusion. An example of
the "direct" language is: "This policy does not apply: . . . to any
2 Id. at 763.
3Id. at 763-64.
34 Id. at 764.
35 Id. at 764-65.
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aircraft, while in flight, .. . operated by a Student Pilot carrying
passenger(s), . .
In Macalco Inc. v. Gulf Insurance Co.," a denial of coverage
under the "indirect" language was put to the test. A policy issued
by Gulf Insurance Company (Gulf) to Macalco Incorporated
(Macalco) provided: "This policy does not apply: . . . while the
aircraft is in flight . . . operated by a Student Pilot unless such
flight . . . is with the specific advance approval of and under the
supervision and control of an F.A.A. Certificated Commercial In-
structor Pilot.""5 The pilot clause in the policy's declarations pro-
vided that:
'7. Pilots: It is a condition hereof that such 'Flight' coverage as is
provided by the policy applies only while the aircraft is being
operated by the following specified Pilot(s) while holding proper
Certificate(s) and Rating(s) as required by the Federal Aviation
Agency for the flight involved:
(a) (x) Orville McDowell or Jack D. Cotton. .
The aircraft crashed, killing pilot McDowell and two passengers.
Upon investigation, Gulf determined that McDowell possessed only
a student pilot certificate. Coverage was denied by Gulf because
McDowell was carrying passengers and was not properly rated and
certificated for the flight involved. Additionally, but not directly
relevant to this issue, there was a charge of misrepresentation
against McDowell because his signed application for insurance
stated that he was a private pilot. In its decision upholding the
coverage denial by Gulf the court stated:
[W]hile McDowell's certificate and rating may have been proper
for flights authorized for student pilots by FAA, it was not proper
for the flight involved because, under FAA regulations, McDowell's
student certification did not authorize him to act as a pilot in
command of an aircraft that was carrying passengers. Exclusion
6(d) does not conflict with the Pilot Clause. The exclusion, recog-
nizing the possibility of extension of coverage to flights made by
student pilots, simply restricts coverage to such flights only if they
be made 'with the specific advance approval of and under the
' Avemco Insurance Co. Policy Form AVP(7-71)-I, Exclusions S (f) (2).
37550 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
3 81d. at 886.
39 Id.
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supervision and control of an F.A.A. Certificated Commercial
Instructor Pilot."
The court went on to state that, in its judgment, a showing of a
causal connection between the breach of the pilot warranty and
the cause of the loss was not necessary and that an insurer could
deny coverage based on the breach alone.'
Insurer's Duty To Investigate Pilot Qualifications
An argument has been made that an insurer has a duty to in-
vestigate pilot qualifications and, if it does not, it should be liable
for the loss or injury to a third party. In Fireman's Fund Insurance
Co. v. Superior Court,' the court struck down this argument,
saying that aircraft liability insurance can be issued to any air-
craft owner and that the insurer has no duty to investigate the
owner's qualifications as a pilot, absent a showing of participation
by the insurer in the conduct resulting in injury.'
PASSENGER COVERAGE EXCLUSION
Depending on the needs and desires of the insured, an aviation
policy may or may not provide liability insurance protection for
injury to or death of certain persons in the insured aircraft. Once
an insured and his insurer have decided to exclude liability cover-
age for persons injured in the insured's aircraft, the end result of
non-coverage can be arrived at in a number of different ways. Indi-
vidual insurers use different language to accomplish the result
intended. If an insurer's policy provides coverage for persons whom
the insured decides to exclude, a specific exclusion will be required
to delete it. If an insurer, however, never provides for this coverage
in the insuring agreement, no exclusion is logically mandated.
One need not take away what one has never given.
A cautious and common approach to this contractually bar-
gained for end is for an insurer to indicate in the insuring agree-
ment that the policy may or may not provide coverage for passen-
gers, depending on which is indicated in the policy's declaration
page. The policy will then go on to exclude passenger coverage in
40 ld. at 890.
41 Id. at 892.
175 Cal. App. 3d 627, 142 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1977).
75 Cal. App. 3d at 637, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56.
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its exclusion section if the declaration page does not indicate that
the insured has purchased it. By cross-referencing the insuring
agreement, the declaration and the exclusion, there can be little
doubt of the policy's intent. Thus, no room is left for an argument
that the policy is ambiguous. The policy's length, however, is
necessarily increased.
Depending on the insurer, the policy may exclude coverage for
"passengers" or it may exclude coverage for "occupants," or both.
The term "occupant" leaves little room for interpretation, even
absent a definition in the policy. The term "passenger" could prove
troublesome, absent a policy definition, since a distinction must be
made between such a person and a pilot or crew member. Absent
a statute specifically requiring that an insurer provide "passenger"
or "occupant" coverage, however, courts have upheld this exclu-
sion where it was clear and unambiguous.
Manny v. Avemco Insurance Co." is a case which arose out of
a suit by the parents of a student pilot who was killed while re-
ceiving dual flight instruction. The instructor pilot, an Avemco
insured, purchased a policy which excluded liability coverage for
injury to occupants or passengers in the insured aircraft. The
policy's relevant portions read:
EXCLUSIONS
'The insurance provided by this Certificate does not apply:
3. To bodily injury, sickness, disease or death of any occupant or
passenger in the aircraft ...
DEFINITIONS
(d) Passenger-shall mean any person while in, on or boarding
the aircraft for the purpose of riding therein or alighting therefrom
following a flight or attempted flight therein, including any person
piloting the aircraft or acting as pilot-in-command.'"
The court agreed with Manny that a student pilot was not a pas-
senger as defined in the policy. The court went on to state, how-
ever, that the policy excluded in a clear and specific manner not
121 Ariz. App. 221, 589 P.2d 464 (1978).
121 Ariz. App. 221, 589 P.2d at 465.
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only coverage for "passengers," but also coverage for an "occu-
pant."
The plaintiff argued further that the policy allowed "limited
commercial" use of the aircraft, which included "Student Instruc-
tion," and that the policy, therefore, was ambiguous in allowing
student instruction in one section yet denying coverage for injury
to a student pilot-occupant in another. The court responded to
this argument in two sentences: "While it may be true that a
flight instructor's primary concern is his student pilot, the flight
instructor contracted with AVEMCO for an insurance policy which
clearly did not included occupants of the plane. We cannot rewrite
the policy for appellants."
Where a policy clearly excludes "passenger" coverage, an alter-
native to the argument that the exclusion is ambiguous has been
constructed by the plaintiffs. This alternative can be termed the
"public policy approach." In Grubb v. Ranger Insurance Co.,"'
appellants contended that the provision excluding coverage for
passengers was in violation of public policy, a contention analogous
to that which has recognized in cases involving automobile lia-
bility insurance. The court responded to this argument by stating:
In contrast to the statutory scheme ... [involving automobile lia-
bility insurance] there was no statutory expression of a public
policy mandating insurance coverage for aircraft passengers at the
time of the airplane crash. To the contrary, at the time of acci-
dent, . . .the Legislature had already passed and the governor
had signed the bill adopting the Uniform Aircraft Financial Re-
sponsibility Act.... "
Of paramount importance, although the court did not specifically
so state in its opinion, was the fact that this Act, which was soon
to go into effect, specifically permitted exclusion of coverage for
non-paying passengers in liability policies. The court went on to
state that:
Under these circumstances, it is apparent that there has never
been legislative or other policy requiring that insurance be fur-
nished to cover the aircraft owner's or operator's liability for
damages for injury or death suffered by a passenger riding in the
121 Ariz. App. 221, 589 P.2d at 466.
4777 Cal. App. 3d 526, 143 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1978).
48 77 Cal. App. 3d at 532, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
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aircraft. It is therefore not appropriate to rewrite the policy here
in issue to create such a liability.49
The appellants argued in the alternative that a municipal ordinance
existed at the time the contract of insurance was negotiated and
that such an ordinance was required by law to be reflected in the
policy. Appellants stated that the law required minimum bodily
injury insurance for passengers in the amount of $100,000Y. The
court rejected this argument, stating that the ordinance did not
on its face require bodily injury coverage and that there was no
evidence that the county interpreted the ordinance cited to impose
such a requirement. Its only purpose was to benefit and protect
the county, not the users of the airport. Furthermore, the ordi-
nance was intended only to cover accidents occurring within the
state, while the loss in this case occurred outside the state."
Even though the court rejected appellants' arguments, it made
two extremely significant statements. First, it said:
Generally, all applicable laws in existence when an agreement
is made necessarily enter into the contract and form a part of it,
without any stipulation to that effect, as fully as if they were
expressly referred to and incorporated in its terms. (Citation
omitted) This principle embraces local ordinances as well as state
statutes.
Secondly, the court stated that: "[The argument that] the ordi-
nance was directed at aircraft owners, and therefore does not bind
the insurance company that issued the policy . . . is without
merit."
CONCLUSION
It is evident from the cases reviewed that no two jurisdictions,
when interpreting the same or a similar exclusion, will necessarily
agree on its application. The only generality that safely can be
made is that each case stands on its own, based upon its unique
factual situation.
49 Id.
• 77 Cal. App. 3d at 529, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
1177 Cal. App. 3d at 530, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 559-60.
",77 Cal. App. 3d at 529, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
3Id.
COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS
Perhaps each case should stand on its own. Two facts, however,
cannot be escaped: uncertainty for the insurer means correspond-
ing uncertainty for the insured and uncertainty costs an insurer by
way of unexpected loss and expense payments. Therefore, prem-
iums charged an insured must be raised commensurately to cope
with this "anticipated unexpected."
One basic principle behind all liability policies is often over-
looked. These policies were not designed to compensate injured
claimants. They were designed to indemnify insureds, and then
only within the risks contemplated.
Why not eliminate exclusions altogether? Tom Davis answered
in his article, Aviation Insurance Exclusions," stating:
Some insurance companies are in the process of rewriting their
policies, or have rewritten them in an attempt to make them better
than their existing policies. They say of their new policy, 'it's
clearer, it's got less exclusions, it has similar language, it's easy
to understand, it's going to eliminate a lot of problems.' For this
we should be pleased. However, if such a policy comes out elimi-
nating all exclusions and other problem areas, perhaps one of the
last paragraphs in such a policy may provide: Notwithstanding
any of the above provisions, it is hereby agreed that due to the
inadequacy of the premium charge, no claims will be paid for any
loss occurring under the terms of this policy. However, in lieu
thereof, upon notification of any such loss, the underwriter will
extend to the insured his deepest sympathy."
"37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 337 (1971).
5 Id. at 341.
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